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INTRODUCTION 
Companies in nearly every industry collect, store, and use personal 
information from consumers.  Recently, company databases have 
become the target of increasingly sophisticated attacks aimed at 
                                                          
 ∗ Editor-in-Chief, American University Law Review, Volume 62; J.D. candidate, May 
2013, American University Washington College of Law; B.A., Linguistics and Philosophy, 
University of Maryland, May 2010.  I am grateful for the support of my family, especially 
my wife, Clarise.  I would like to thank the editors and staff of the American University 
Law Review for their careful work on this Note, in particular Brian Shearer, Kat Scott, 
Jay Curran, and Katie Wright.  Any remaining errors are mine alone. 
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stealing this information.  Data breaches occur with such regularity 
that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has separated 
companies into two categories:  “those that have been hacked, and 
those that will be.”1  The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) plays a 
large role in the cybersecurity world by enforcing specific statutes 
and, more generally, utilizing its authority under the Federal Trade 
Commission Act2 (FTC Act) to penalize companies that allow data 
breaches. 
Recently, however, businesses have begun to push back, contesting 
the FTC’s authority to police information security.  In FTC v. LabMD, 
Inc.,3 a company under FTC investigation for an alleged data breach 
challenged the FTC’s ability to issue an administrative subpoena.4  
LabMD indirectly disputed the FTC’s role in information security and 
its use of the unfairness category of the FTC Act as a basis of 
enforcement in data breach cases.5  The district court ultimately 
found that the FTC made a plausible case for its authority, but based 
its holding on the weight of precedent surrounding the FTC’s 
general use of the FTC Act in information security cases.6  Thus, the 
FTC’s reliance on the FTC Act is currently permitted, but could be 
challenged in the future. 
LabMD’s challenge of the FTC’s authority was significant however, 
because there is no legislative or executive action on privacy, so the 
FTC’s guidance, best practices, and enforcement set the de facto 
“privacy law.”7  As the FTC casts an increasingly wider net with or 
without congressional or executive action on data security, the future 
of the FTC Act’s scope in this area is uncertain. 
                                                          
 1. Stacy Cowley, FBI Director:  Cybercrime Will Eclipse Terrorism, CNNMONEY (Mar. 
2, 2012, 7:55 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/02/technology/fbi_cybersecurity/ 
index.htm.  The Director went on to say “[e]ven that is merging into one category:  
those that have been hacked and will be again.”  Id. 
 2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006, Supp. IV 2011, & Supp. V 2012). 
 3. No. 1:12-cv-3005 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 26, 2012). 
 4. Id. at 4 (outlining MDLab’s attempts to quash the FTC subpoena). 
 5. See Brief in Opposition to Petition of the Federal Trade Commission for an 
Order To Enforce Civil Investigative Demands at 2–3, FTC v. LabMD, Inc., No. 1:12-
cv-3005 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 26, 2012), ECF No. 13 (arguing that the FTC does not have 
jurisdiction over data security generally). 
 6. Id. at 12–14. 
 7. See Michael D. Scott, The FTC, the Unfairness Doctrine, and Data Security Breach 
Litigation:  Has the Commission Gone Too Far?, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 127, 145–49 (2008) 
(“The [FTC] has taken the lead in the United States in regulating privacy issues 
online.”). 
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I. BACKGROUND 
The FTC Act declares “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or 
affecting commerce” to be unlawful.8  The FTC has used both the 
“deceptive” and “unfair” categories of the FTC Act in data security 
cases.9  These cases typically involve settlement discussions in which 
the company enters into a consent order with the FTC.10  The 
consent orders are published for public comment, and, if acceptable, 
are approved by the FTC.11  In the settlement, the FTC typically sets a 
privacy framework and retains the ability to review the company.  For 
example, in a consent order with Google, Inc.,12 the FTC included 
the enactment of a comprehensive privacy program as a term in the 
settlement of the action.13  The FTC went further in a consent order 
with Facebook, Inc.14 when it required Facebook to follow the U.S.-
EU Safe Harbor Principles15 in addition to enacting a privacy 
program.16  These settlement and enforcement mechanisms can be 
controversial based on the FTC’s broad exercise of power over 
information privacy and the relevant law. 
A. Deception 
The FTC Act lists deceptive practices that are unlawful.17  The 
deception category is intended to combat statements and published 
policies breached or disregarded by the companies that published 
them.18  The unauthorized collection of information, or collection 
                                                          
 8. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006). 
 9. Id. 
 10. See, e.g., Facebook, Inc., No. C-4365, FTC File No. 092-3184 (July 27, 2012), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0923184/120810facebookdo.pdf (describing  
a settlement with the FTC for privacy violations); Google, Inc., No. C-4336, FTC File 
No. 102-3136 (Oct. 13, 2011) available at http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/1023136/111024 
googlebuzzdo.pdf (same). 
 11. Facebook, Inc., No. C-4365, FTC File No. 092-3184 (Aug. 10, 2012) 
(statement of the Commission), available at http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/0923184/120810 
facebookstmtcomm.pdf. 
 12. No. C-4336, FTC File No. 102-3136 (Oct. 13, 2011) available at http://ftc.gov/ 
os/caselist/1023136/111024googlebuzzdo.pdf. 
 13. Id. at 4–7. 
 14. No. C-4365, FTC File No. 092-3184 (July 27, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov 
/os/caselist/0923184/120810facebookdo.pdf. 
 15. Id. at 4.  The U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Framework allows U.S. companies to self-
certify compliance with the European Commission’s Directive on Data Protection, 
which prohibits data transfers to countries that do not have “adequate” privacy 
protection.  See U.S.-EU Safe Harbor Overview, EXPORT.GOV, http://export.gov/safeharbor 
/eu/eg_main_018476.asp (last updated Apr. 26, 2012, 3:08 PM). 
 16. Facebook, No. C-4365, at 3–6. 
 17. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(4)(a) (2006). 
 18. See Scott, supra note 7, at 131 (describing the FTC’s increased enforcement 
efforts to prevent websites from utilizing deceptive trade practices). 
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that extends beyond limits set by a company’s stated privacy policy, is 
fertile ground for enforcement actions under the deception category. 
Establishing a violation of the FTC Act’s prohibition of deceptive 
practices requires a showing of a material representation or practice 
that is “likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the 
circumstances.”19  Additionally, the FTC Act imposes a heightened 
pleading requirement to prove a violation based on deceptive 
practices.20 
The FTC has a relatively easy argument when it can show that a 
company has made promises to consumers that it has not kept.  For 
example, the FTC leveraged a section 5 complaint into a consent 
decree with Google.21  There, the FTC charged that Google’s roll-out 
of “Google Buzz”—a social-media feature of Google’s e-mail service, 
Gmail—allowed consumers to choose whether they took part in 
Google Buzz.22  However, many consumers’ personal information was 
added to Google Buzz despite the fact that they had opted out of the 
service.23  Thus, by collecting this information without the user’s 
permission, Google faced FTC charges for deceptive practices.24  By 
finding a violation of the FTC Act when companies fail to fulfill their 
promises to consumers, the FTC has successfully used the deception 
category of section 5 against some of the largest players in the world 
of consumer data collection.25 
B. Unfairness 
The unfairness category of section 5 provides a broad yet more 
diffuse source of authority for enforcing information privacy.  Under 
                                                          
 19. FTC v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 928 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting FTC v. Gill, 265 
F.3d 944, 950 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
 20. See FTC v. Ivy Capital, Inc., No. 2:11-CV-283, 2011 WL 2118626, at *3 (D. Nev. 
May 25, 2011) (applying the particularity requirements in Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 9(b) to a FTC Act claim for deception); FTC v. Lights of Am., Inc., 760 F. 
Supp. 2d 848, 853 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (same). 
 21. Google Inc., No. C-43436, FTC File No. 102-3136 (Oct. 13, 2011), available at 
http://ftc.gov/os/caselist/1023136/111024googlebuzzdo.pdf; see Francoise Gilbert, 
FTC v. Google:  A Blueprint for Your Next Privacy Audit, J. INTERNET L., Dec. 2012, at 1, 
15.  The district court issued Google a $22.5 million civil penalty for violating the 
consent decree.  See United States v. Google, Inc., CV 12-04177, 2012 WL 5833994, at 
*5–6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2012). 
 22. Complaint at 2–3, Google Inc., No. C-4336, FTC File No. 102-3136 (Oct. 13, 
2011) [hereinafter Google Complaint], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/10 
23136/111024googlebuzzcmpt.pdf; see also Gilbert, supra note 21, at 15. 
 23. Google Complaint, supra note 22, at 2–5; see also Gilbert, supra note 21, at 15. 
 24. Google Complaint, supra note 22, at 5–6 (alleging that Google used personal 
data in a different way from its express and implied uses, constituting a deceptive act). 
 25. See, e.g., Gilbert, supra note 21, at 15 (describing how the FTC filed a 
deception claim against Google that resulted in a record-setting $22.5 million 
consent decree). 
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the unfairness category, the company practice must injure consumers 
and violate established public policy.26  Recognizing that it would be 
impossible to create an exhaustive list of unfair trade practices, 
Congress left the FTC responsible for identifying such practices.27 
The 1980 Unfairness Statement guides the analysis of whether the 
Commission properly applied the unfairness doctrine in a particular 
situation.  In 1994, the FTC codified the Unfairness Statement in a 
revision to section 5(n), which now states that: 
The Commission shall have no authority under this section or 
section 57a of this title to declare unlawful an act or practice on the 
grounds that such act or practice is unfair unless the act or practice 
causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is 
not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not 
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to 
competition.  In determining whether an act or practice is unfair, 
the Commission may consider established public policies as 
evidence to be considered with all other evidence.  Such public 
policy considerations may not serve as a primary basis for such 
determination.28 
The FTC has since used the unfairness category as a basis for 
complaints against companies that have inadequate data security.  
For example, in a complaint against BJ’s Wholesale Club, the FTC 
alleged that BJ’s lack of security allowed for thousands of consumers’ 
credit and debit card information to be taken.29  Similarly, the FTC 
filed a complaint against Designer Shoe Warehouse (DSW), alleging 
improper information practices.30  DSW collected consumer credit 
card information—including names, card numbers, and expiration 
dates.31  The company then stored the information unencrypted, in 
multiple places, and failed to use readily available security measures.32  
In both cases, the FTC used the unfairness category to hold the 
                                                          
 26. See Letter from the Fed. Trade Comm’n to Senators Wendell H. Ford & John 
C. Danforth (Dec. 17, 1980) [hereinafter Unfairness Statement], reprinted in Int’l 
Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1070–76 (1984). 
 27. Id.; S. REP. NO. 63-597, at 13 (1914) (concluding that a “general declaration 
condemning unfair practices” that would be interpreted by the commission was 
preferable to an “attempt to define” unfair practices); William E. Kovacic & Marc 
Winerman, Competition Policy and the Application of Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 929, 931 (2010) (stating that one of the motivations 
behind the FTC Act was to “adjust the boundaries of acceptable business conduct in 
light of evolving business practices and developments in economic and legal 
understanding”). 
 28. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006). 
 29. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 140 F.T.C. 465, 467–69 (2005). 
 30. DSW Inc., 141 F.T.C. 117, 119–20 (2006). 
 31. Id. at 118–20. 
 32. Id. at 119. 
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companies accountable, not for posting a deceptive policy, but for 
lacking adequate security measures.33  These cases demonstrate the 
broad applicability of the unfairness category of the FTC Act. 
C. FTC Privacy Reports 2000 & 2010 
The FTC launched the Advisory Committee on Online Access and 
Security in 1999 to investigate the security of consumers’ personal 
information online.34  The 2000 Privacy Report, submitted on May 15, 
2000, demonstrated that online “security” is a fluid and evolving 
concept that must address the changing threat and particular 
circumstances unique to each website.35  The 2000 Privacy Report 
called for an appropriateness standard which would require each 
website to have a security program to protect personal information to 
the extent that is “appropriate to the circumstances.”36  Specifically, 
the 2000 Privacy Report called for legislation and application of the 
Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs), and asked for authority 
to implement the FIPPs.37 
The 2000 Privacy Report is not without its detractors.  Some view it 
as abandoning self-regulation in favor of government regulation and 
argue that the legislation called for in the Report would be overly 
                                                          
 33. Scott, supra note 7, at 145–49. 
 34. See Advisory Committee on Online Access and Security, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
http://www.ftc.gov/acoas (last visited Apr. 24, 2013). 
 35. See ADVISORY COMM. ON ONLINE ACCESS & SEC., FED. TRADE COMM’N, FINAL 
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ONLINE ACCESS 
AND SECURITY 25 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 PRIVACY REPORT], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/acoas/papers/acoasfinal1.pdf. 
 36. Id. 
 37. 2000 PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 35, at 26; see also Scott, supra note 7, at 141 
n.94 (noting that “[w]hile the Report refers to the ‘implementing authority’ 
generally, it is clear from the context of the Report that the Commission considered 
itself to be the appropriate agency to implement the Fair Information Practice 
Principles”).  The FIPPs originated from a U.S. Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare (HEW) proposal for fair information principles.  2000 PRIVACY REPORT, 
supra note 35, at 3–4 & nn.24–25.  The FIPPs as summarized in the 2000 Privacy 
Report include: 
(1) Notice—data collectors must disclose their information 
practices before collecting personal information from 
consumers; 
(2) Choice—consumers must be given options with respect to 
whether and how personal information collected from them 
may be used for purposes beyond those for which the 
information was provided; 
(3) Access—consumers should be able to view and contest the 
accuracy and completeness of data collected about them; and 
(4) Security—data collectors must take reasonable steps to assure 
that information collected from consumers is accurate and 
secure from unauthorized use. 
Id. 
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broad.38  The detractors assert that “extensive, yet vaguely phrased, 
privacy requirements” constitute a “blank check” to the FTC or any 
other agency.39  Others have argued that the Report relies too heavily 
on FIPPs, which in turn relies heavily on reasonability.40 
The FTC examined information privacy again through a series of 
roundtable discussions, culminating in a proposed framework.41  The 
preliminary 2010 Privacy Report states that industry efforts to address 
privacy through self-regulation “have been too slow, and up to now 
have failed to provide adequate and meaningful protection.”42  As the 
2010 Privacy Report highlights, FIPPs, and specifically the security 
principle, have formed the basis of the FTC’s approach to self-
regulation and online privacy policies.43  The FIPPs have long been at 
the core of the FTC’s approach to privacy and are used as a basis for 
the FTC’s recommended best practices.44  The FIPPs concept of 
“notice-and-choice” is a common foundation for the FTC’s 
application of its authority under section 5 of the FTC Act for 
deceptive or unfair practices.45  In addition to reaffirming the FIPPs, 
the FTC noted the shift from the use of the deceptive category to the 
unfairness category through the use of the “harm-based model.”46 
D. FTC Final Privacy Report 2012 
In March 2012, the FTC issued a final report that incorporated 
public comments as well as commercial and technological advances.47  
The 2012 Privacy Report provides a guide to legislation and a set of 
                                                          
 38. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE:  FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE 
ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE—A REPORT TO CONGRESS 1, 16–17 (2000) (dissenting 
statement of Commissioner Orson Swindle), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/ 
privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf. 
 39. Id. at 27. 
 40. See id. at 1, 5–6 (statement of Commissioner Thomas B. Leary concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 41. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID 
CHANGE:  A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS—PRELIMINARY 
FTC STAFF REPORT 1–2 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 PRIVACY REPORT], available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12/101201privacyreport.pdf.  The preliminary report 
proposed a framework and raised issues and questions for public comment.  Id. 
 42. Id. at iii. 
 43. Id. at 7–9 & n.14. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 8–9. 
 46. See id. at 9 (“Rather than emphasizing potentially costly notice-and-choice 
requirements for all uses of information, the harm-based model targeted practices 
that caused or were likely to cause physical or economic harm, or unwarranted 
intrusions in [consumers’] daily lives.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 47. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE:  
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS, at iii (2012) [hereinafter 2012 
PRIVACY REPORT], available at http://ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf. 
FRECHETTE.OFF_TO_WEBSITE (DO NOT DELETE) 7/3/2013  2:28 PM 
1408 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:1401 
best practices to balance the privacy interests of consumers with 
innovation that relies on consumer information to develop beneficial 
new products and services.48 
The 2012 Privacy Report again utilizes the FIPPs for its framework 
of best practices for protection of consumer privacy.49  The Report 
embraces the concept of privacy by design, asking companies to 
incorporate “substantive privacy protections into their practices, such 
as data security, reasonable collection limits, sound retention and 
disposal practices, and data accuracy.”50  It urges Congress to enact 
data security and data broker legislation, and calls on industry to 
hasten self-regulation processes.51  The Report also reaffirms the 
FTC’s decision to enforce “reasonable security for consumer data” 
through section 5.52 
The 2012 Privacy Report identifies five main “action items” in the 
realm of data security and privacy:  (1) Do-Not-Track; (2) mobile 
security and privacy; (3) transparency in data brokerage; (4) security 
of “large platforms” such as ISPs, operating systems, browsers, and 
social media companies; and (5) further development of self-
regulatory codes.53 
The 2012 Privacy Report was not approved unanimously.  
Commissioner Rosch dissented from its issuance on several grounds, 
including what he views as conflicting with the FTC’s statements to 
Congress indicating that it would base its enforcement in deception, 
rather than the unfairness category under the FTC Act.54  
Commissioner Rosch argued that “‘[u]nfairness’ is an elastic and 
elusive concept,” the definition of which will vary according to a 
party’s view of privacy and information gathering in general, and 
therefore is an inappropriate mechanism to govern information 
gathering and security practices.55  Rosch asserted that by setting a 
high priority on privacy, the FTC has chosen to side with consumer 
                                                          
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at i. 
 50. Id. at 30. 
 51. Id. at viii. 
 52. Id. at 24 (“It is well settled that companies must provide reasonable security 
for consumer data.  The Commission has a long history of enforcing data security 
obligations under Section 5 of the FTC Act . . . .”). 
 53. Id. at 13–14. 
 54. See id. at C-3 to C-5 (dissenting statement of Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch) 
(noting that the 2012 Privacy Report defined “consumer harm” in a way that allowed 
the use of the unfairness category).  Regarding the Google consent order, the 2012 
Privacy Report states that “[a]lthough the complaint against Google alleged that the 
company used deceptive tactics and violated its own privacy promises when it 
launched Google Buzz, even in the absence of such misrepresentations, revealing 
previously-private consumer data could cause consumer harm.”  Id. at 8 n.37. 
 55. Id. at C-3 (dissenting statement of Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch). 
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organizations and large enterprises and placed a burden on smaller 
groups.56 
Commissioner Rosch also worried about the future of the self-
regulatory model, given that the 2012 Privacy Report’s recommended 
best practices were nearly identical to the executive branch’s 
Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights.57  FTC enforcement of the “best 
practices” would effectively make the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights 
compulsory, without adoption by Congress.58  No statute or 
enforceable code of conduct would be needed if “firms fe[lt] obliged 
to comply with the ‘best practices’ or face the wrath of ‘the 
Commission’ or its staff.”59 
II. FTC V. LABMD, INC. 
A. Background 
After issuing a 2008 Resolution on procedures for investigating 
consumer privacy violations, in 2009 the FTC discovered that peer-to-
peer (P2P) file sharing programs were disclosing private consumer 
data.60  As a result, the FTC investigated whether companies had 
failed to use reasonable privacy protection measures or had violated 
any other applicable regulations.61  To do so, the FTC issued Civil 
Investigative Demands (CIDs) to acquire digital copies of the private 
consumer information.62  The FTC then received files containing 
private identifying information, such as names, dates of birth, and 
social security numbers of approximately 9000 LabMD customers.63 
                                                          
 56. See id. at C-4 (“The ‘final’ Privacy Report . . . repeatedly sides with consumer 
organizations and large enterprises.”). 
 57. See id. at C-8.  The Obama Administration put forth a “Consumer Privacy Bill of 
Rights” and encouraged Congress to use it as a baseline for consumer privacy legislation.  
See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD:  A 
FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL 
ECONOMY, at ii, 45 (2012) [hereinafter CONSUMER PRIVACY BILL OF RIGHTS], available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf. 
 58. 2012 PRIVACY REPORT, supra note 47, at C-8 (dissenting statement of 
Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch). 
 59. Id. 
 60. FTC v. LabMD, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-3005, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 26, 2012).  
P2P is a method of sharing information directly between two or more computers on 
a network, such as LimeWire, KaZaa, or BitTorrent.  Peer-to-Peer File Sharing:  A Guide 
for Business, FED. TRADE COMM’N 1 (Jan. 2010), http://business.ftc.gov/sites/default/ 
files/pdf/bus46-peer-peer-file-sharing-guide-business.pdf.  The Bureau of Consumer 
Protection cautions about the security risks inherent in P2P systems because the 
systems allow other users to access entire drives on the sharing computer, not simply 
the files a person might have wished to share.  Id. at 2. 
 61. LabMD, No. 1:12-cv-3005, slip op. at 2. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
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LabMD objected to the CIDs and filed an unsuccessful petition to 
limit or quash the CIDs.64  After several months of LabMD’s non-
compliance, the FTC sought a court order to require LabMD to 
comply with the FTC’s requests issued pursuant to its authority under 
15 U.S.C. §§ 46, 57b-1 and the 2008 Resolution.65  The FTC claimed 
that “[LabMD]’s failure to comply with the CIDs greatly impede[d] 
the Commission’s ongoing investigation [into breaches of 
consumers’ sensitive personal information], and prevent[ed] the 
Commission from completing its investigation in a timely manner.”66 
In September 2012, the court ordered LabMD to attend a hearing 
and file a pleading asserting its “legal and factual support for failing 
to comply with the FTC’s CIDs” and explain why the court should 
refrain from ordering compliance with the CIDs.67  Among other 
questions, the court asked how the FTC met the “within the authority 
of the agency” standard.68 
One of the requirements for a governmental agency subpoena to 
be valid is a “plausible argument in support of its assertion of 
jurisdiction.”69  Thus, the district court has a somewhat limited role, 
and is constrained to analyzing the breadth of an agency’s 
jurisdiction.70  However, given the paucity of cases involving the FTC 
and consumer information security that are heard by the courts and 
the intense debate over the future of data security law, any judicial 
analysis is helpful.  Thus, LabMD presented the court with an 
opportunity to provide some much needed judicial guidance. 
B. FTC’s Move Away from the Self-Regulation Model of Data Security 
Until 2000, the model of FTC enforcement of consumer privacy 
and information security followed a standardized pattern.71  Under 
the self-regulatory model, businesses could help develop standards by 
                                                          
 64. See LabMD’s Petition To Limit or Quash the Civil Investigative Demand, 
LabMD, Inc., FTC File No. 102-3099 (Jan. 10, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/ 
os/quash/120110labmdpetition.pdf. 
 65. LabMD, No. 1:12-cv-3005, slip op. at 4. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 4–5. 
 68. Id. at 5. 
 69. EEOC v. Kloster Cruise Ltd., 939 F.2d 920, 922 (11th Cir. 1991) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 70. See Casey v. FTC, 578 F.2d 793, 799 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating that a “district 
court’s role in a subpoena enforcement proceeding is strictly limited where the 
subpoena is attacked for lack of agency jurisdiction”); see also FTC v. Ken 
Roberts Co., 276 F.3d 583, 586 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that “courts of appeals have 
consistently deferred to agency determinations of their own investigative authority”). 
 71. See Scott, supra note 7, at 130 (observing that the “FTC initially sought to deal 
with online privacy issues by encouraging industry self-regulation”). 
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holding themselves to heightened duties and obligations regarding 
consumer information.72  This is most evident in the FTC’s use of the 
deceptive practices category to enforce compliance with published 
privacy statements; companies that made promises to consumers 
about the safety or usage of personal information were punished 
when they did not live up to those promises.73 
However, the FTC has become increasingly forceful in its use of 
section 5 to enforce information privacy and security.74  The 
transition away from using the deceptive practices category to the 
unfair practices category occurred when the FTC filed complaints in 
instances where there had been no violation of stated privacy 
policies.75 
C. LabMD Contests the FTC’s Authority 
As LabMD argued and as the district court generally agreed, the 
FTC’s power under the unfairness category is “not unlimited.”76  
Specifically, LabMD asserted that the 2008 Resolution is overly vague, 
and attacked the FTC’s use of the unfairness category as improper 
because the FTC had not shown an injury to consumers.77 
The court disagreed with LabMD on its two attacks against FTC 
jurisdiction.  It found that the 2008 Resolution “sufficiently specifies 
the nature, scope, and subject matter upon which subpoenas and 
demands for information may be made.”78  The court was much more 
circumspect on LabMD’s second argument, finding that one could 
persuasively argue that section 5 does not grant the FTC authority to 
investigate data security breaches.79 
                                                          
 72. Id. 
 73. See id. (“The main element of self-regulation included FTC enforcement of 
those privacy policies that companies collecting personal information posted on 
their websites.”); see also supra Part I.A (highlighting the use of the deceptive 
practices category of section 5 in information privacy cases). 
 74. See Challenges Facing the Federal Trade Commission:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Commerce, Trade, & Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th 
Cong. 12, 16 (2001) (statement of Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n) (describing the FTC as “primarily a law enforcement agency”). 
 75. See supra Part I.B (discussing the use of section 5’s unfairness category against 
BJ’s Wholesale Club and DSW). 
 76. FTC v. LabMD, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-3005, slip op. at 10 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 26, 2012) 
(“Although it is given broad discretion to determine what constitutes an unfair 
practice, the FTC’s authority to investigate unfair practices using its subpoena 
enforcement power is not unlimited.”). 
 77. Id. at 11. 
 78. Id. at 11–12. 
 79. Id. at 14–15. 
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Conversely, to support its ruling, the court turned to prior FTC 
information security enforcement cases.80  The court found that, “in 
light of the threat of substantial consumer harm that occurs when 
consumers are victims of identity theft,” the FTC successfully argued 
that protecting the privacy of electronic consumer data falls within 
the scope of the Commission’s investigatory authority.81  The court 
also relied on the weight of precedent in making its decision, stating 
that “federal courts have recognized the FTC’s authority under 
Section 5 to investigate and use its authority to address unfair 
practices regarding related data security and consumer privacy 
issues.”82 
However, although the cases cited by the district court represent 
holdings in favor of FTC jurisdiction over data security, they do not 
sweep as broadly as more recent FTC enforcements.83  The cases cited 
by the court fall easily into section 5’s prohibition of deceptive 
practices and involve some action taken by the defendant companies 
that impacted their customers’ information security.84  LabMD, 
however, addressed alleged omissions in a company’s information 
security practices and procedures that allowed a third party to 
illegally obtain consumer information.85 
Throwing most of its argument behind the weight of history and 
precedent, the district court only briefly addressed the broader scope 
of section 5 that the FTC argued against LabMD.  The court asserted: 
[I]t is a plausible argument to assert that poor data security and 
consumer privacy practices facilitate and contribute to predictable 
and substantial harm to consumers in violation of Section 5 
                                                          
 80. Id. at 13 (noting that the FTC has engaged in enforcement related to 
information security in “at least forty-four instances since 2000”). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Compare FTC v. Pricewert LLC, No. C-09-2407, 2010 WL 329913, at *1 (N.D. 
Cal. Jan. 20, 2010) (using section 5 against a company that specifically “distribut[ed] 
illegal, malicious and harmful electronic content”), with LabMD, No. 1:12-cv-3005 
(using section 5 against a company that allegedly failed to use adequate security 
methods to protect its customers’ data).  The FTC has also settled with Franklin’s 
Budget Car Sales, Inc., and EPN, Inc., for generally failing to implement “reasonable 
and appropriate data security measures.”  See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, 
FTC Charges Businesses Exposed Sensitive Information on Peer-to-Peer File-Sharing 
Networks, Putting Thousands of Consumers at Risk (June 07, 2012), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/06/epn-franklin.shtm. 
 84. See FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., No. 06-CV-105, 2007 WL 4356786, at *1, *7–8 (D. 
Wyo. Sept. 28, 2007) (addressing the unauthorized disclosure of confidential 
customer phone records), aff’d, 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009); FTC v. Seismic 
Entm’t Prods., Inc., No. Civ. 04-377, 2004 WL 2403124, at *2–4 (D.N.H. Oct. 21, 
2004) (addressing a company’s use of methods that cause unauthorized changes to 
computers and that affect data security). 
 85. LabMD, No. 1:12-cv-3005, slip op. at 12–15. 
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because it is disturbingly commonplace for people to wrongfully 
exploit poor data security and consumer privacy practices to 
wrongfully acquire and exploit personal consumer information.86 
Thus, the court did not fully address the FTC’s enforcement of data 
privacy because the FTC’s investigatory authority needs only a 
“plausible argument” for jurisdiction.87 
III. THE FUTURE OF THE FTC’S SELF-REGULATORY DATA SECURITY 
REGIME 
In testimony before the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 
Chairman Leibowitz described “the three main principles” of the 
FTC’s approach to information security and privacy.88  According to 
Chairman Leibowitz, businesses should (1) customize and (2) 
simplify their electronic data privacy protections, as well as (3) 
provide increased transparency regarding such practices.89  The 
Chairman also stated that “enforcement remains a top priority for the 
[FTC]”; indicating that the FTC will continue to make use of the 
“unfair” and “deceptive” language of the FTC Act to enforce FIPPs.90 
Section 5, however, does not expressly include information security 
and privacy in the FTC’s jurisdiction.91  Rather, the FTC has authority 
to regulate unfair practices that “cause[] or [are] likely to cause 
substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by 
consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits 
to consumers or to competition.”92  This is a necessarily fluid 
jurisdiction, given the constant evolution of business practices and 
norms.93 
                                                          
 86. Id. at 14–15. 
 87. Id. at 15 (finding that LabMD’s argument against the FTC’s jurisdiction “is 
not a sufficient reason to deny the FTC’s request for enforcement”). 
 88. Balancing Privacy and Innovation:  Does the President’s Proposal Tip the Scale?:  
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg. & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy & 
Commerce, 112th Cong. 4 (2012) (statement of Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/republicans.energy 
commerce.house.gov/files/Hearings/CMT/20120329/HHRG-112-IF17-WState-
JLeibowitz-20120329.pdf. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 15–18. 
 91. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006). 
 92. Id.  Administrative agencies like the FTC are also limited by the 
reasonableness test.  See Genuine Parts Co. v. FTC, 445 F.2d 1382, 1391 (5th Cir. 
1971) (explaining reasonableness requirements in investigations initiated by 
administrative agencies). 
 93. See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239–44 (1972) (reasoning 
that Congress refused to provide a specific definition of “unfair methods of 
competition” because it would be impossible to include them all); see also Orkin 
Exterminating Co. v. FTC, 849 F.2d 1354, 1367–68 (11th Cir. 1988) (giving the FTC 
the authority to interpret section 5 in light of new business practices). 
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Unfairness, as the courts have interpreted it, does not only rely on 
“the machinations of those with ill intentions;” it relies on the 
foreseeable results of “ill intentioned schemes.”94  Additionally, the 
FTC itself has consistently been seen as having a role in interpreting 
section 5,95 and has developed a history of enforcing the FTC Act in 
data security and privacy areas in over forty instances since 2000.96  
Precedent seems to be firmly on the side of the FTC and its role in 
enforcing information security and consumer privacy.97  However, the 
FTC faces a different challenge to its use of the FTC Act’s unfairness 
category in FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.98  Both Wyndham and 
amicus parties argue that the FTC’s authority to regulate unfair 
practices does not extend to data breaches caused by third parties.99  
                                                          
 94. FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 2010); see also FTC v. R.F. 
Keppel & Bro., 291 U.S. 304, 314 (1934) (holding a retailer liable for unfair practices 
when the manufacturer was responsible for the unfairness); Regina Corp. v. FTC, 322 
F.2d 765, 768 (3d Cir. 1963) (“One who places in the hands of another a means of 
consummating a fraud or competing unfairly in violation of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act is himself guilty of a violation of the Act.” (quoting C. Howard Hunt 
Pen Co. v. FTC, 197 F.2d 273, 281 (3d Cir. 1952))). 
 95. See Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1985) 
(“Congress has not at any time withdrawn the broad discretionary authority originally 
granted the Commission . . . .”); FTC v. Windward Mktg., Ltd., No. Civ. A. 1:96-CV-
615F, 1997 WL 33642380, at *11 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 30, 1997) (“Congress has not 
enacted any more particularized definition of unfairness . . . .”). 
 96. See Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Wyndham Hotels and Resorts’ 
Motion To Dismiss at 7, FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., No. 2:12-cv-01365 (D. 
Ariz. filed Oct. 1, 2012), ECF No. 45; Legal Resources, FTC BUREAU OF CONSUMER 
PROT., http://business.ftc.gov/legal-resources/29/35 (last visited Apr. 24, 2013) 
(listing forty-six cases). 
 97. See FTC v. Pricewert LLC, No. C-09-2407, 2010 WL 329913, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 
Jan. 20, 2010) (explaining an unsuccessful Fourth Amendment challenge to the 
FTC’s seizure of electronic property and granting the FTC’s request to prohibit 
Pricewert from “distributing or hosting” certain electronic programs harmful to 
consumers); FTC v. CyberSpy Software, LLC, No. 6:08-cv-1872-Orl-31GJK, 2009 WL 
455417, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 23, 2009) (determining that Congress granted the FTC 
the authority to bring suits in district courts against anyone it suspects of violating 
any law within its jurisdiction); FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., No. 06-CV-105-D, 2007 WL 
4356786, at *1, *7–10 (D. Wyo. Sept. 28, 2007) (finding that the FTC has jurisdiction 
over breaches of private data when it results in “substantial injury to consumers”), 
aff’d 570 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2009); FTC v. Seismic Entm’t Prods., Inc., No. Civ. 04-
377, 2004 WL 2403124, at *2–4 (D.N.H. 2004) (describing that for an FTC claim 
against pop-up advertisements the court must give greater deference to public 
interests).  But see FTC v. LabMD, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-3005, slip op. at 14 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 
26, 2012) (finding “significant merit to Respondents’ argument that Section 5 does not 
justify an investigation into data security practices and consumer privacy issues” but 
holding that “it is a plausible argument to assert that poor data security and 
consumer privacy practices” violate section 5 since “it is disturbingly commonplace 
for people to wrongfully exploit poor data security” (emphasis added)). 
 98. Motion to Dismiss by Defendants Wyndham, Worldwide Corp., Wyndham 
Hotel Group, LLC, & Wyndham Hotel Management, Inc., FTC v. Wyndham 
Worldwide Corp., No. CV 12-1365 (D. Ariz. filed Aug. 27, 2012), transferred to No. 
2:13-CV-01887 (D.N.J. docketed Mar. 26, 2013), 2012 WL 3916987. 
 99. See id. at 1 (claiming that the FTC brought a claim against one corporation 
for the actions of another); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of 
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This challenge to the FTC’s authority will shape the Commission’s 
role in the data security realm in the future.100 
CONCLUSION 
Through its use of section 5, the FTC fills a void in information 
security law and provides necessary protections for consumers.  The 
FTC itself, however, recognizes the incompleteness of its jurisdiction 
when it comes to consumer privacy and data security, and has 
repeatedly called on Congress to pass legislation to delineate a 
framework. 
Information security is complicated by the fact that companies that 
collect consumer information often become targets of increasingly 
sophisticated attacks.  These attacks pull data breaches away from the 
standard types of cases pursued through the FTC Act’s unfairness 
category. 
In the absence of legislation or executive action, it is left to the 
FTC’s discretion, ultimately reviewed by the courts, to determine 
what failures fall into its purview.  FTC v. LabMD, however, breaks the 
norm and challenges the FTC’s self-regulatory model.  Although 
future court decisions may decide that the FTC can use the 
unfairness category of section 5 to investigate companies and protect 
consumer privacy, they may also stop short of allowing the FTC to 
create its own authority through resolutions that have no legislative 
or executive backing. 
                                                          
the United States of America et al. at 2–3, Wyndham Worldwide Corp., No. CV 12-1365, 
2012 WL 4766977 (arguing that giving the FTC enforcement authority would go 
against congressional intent by allowing government action whenever a private 
business suffers a third-party data privacy violation). 
 100. See Corey Dennis, FTC’s Authority to Regulate Data Security—FTC v. Wyndham, 
GOVERNO L. FIRM LLC (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.governo.com/TheFirm/News.asp? 
NewsID=665 (asserting that the Wyndham case could “severely limit” the FTC’s power 
to regulate data privacy in the future). 
